Sanity: The Psychiatrico-Legal Communicative Gap by Lawrence, James K. L.
SANITY: THE PSYCHIATRICO-LEGAL
COMMUNICATIVE..GAP
JAmtEs K. L. LAWRENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
That there exists a pressing problem in the administration of
criminal justice over the failure in communications between lawyer
and medical expert' is beyond question. On the one hand, the lawyer,
with an ear to the societal heartbeat, may be satisfied with a "legal" test
for determining criminal accountability. But the medical expert is
unable to cope with the questions which he is asked in applying that test
in particular instances. He refuses to answer queries directed at the
defendant's "responsibility" or "blameworthiness." And he is not
competent to define so-called medical terms which, in fact, are not
part of his professional jargon. On the other hand, the medical expert
may find no difficulty in explaining the defendant's mental state in
familiar medical terms; but judge and jury either cannot understand
his terminology or are unable to correlate the medical explanation with
the legal test to be applied.
It must be kept in mind that the law adopts a philosophy of
pragmatism.' This pragmatic approach is tempered to meet the needs
of social justice. It should follow axiomatically that the language
of the law should be functional in order to achieve necessary sociolegal
ends. The language should not, however, invite metaphysical dilemmas
or medical bickering between the several schools of thought on the
cause and cure of mental ills. Functional usage of language should
permit the law and the medical expert to reconcile the conffict in com-
munications adequately to satisfy the operative presumptions or as-
sumptions of each profession.
A clear case in point is the law's inefficacious use of the word
"sanity." Couching "sanity" in terms of a legal presumption is often
misleading. Medical experts are unable to communicate in terms of
"sanity" the state of mind of most persons without forsaking their
professional integrity. But, presumptions or inferences of "how most
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
1 The term "medical expert" will be employed to include any expert qualified to
testify on the issue of criminal responsibility, e.g., the psychiatrist, the psychoanalyst, the
psychologist, the clinical psychologist, the sociologist, and the anthropologist.
2 See, e.g., Cardozo, The Nature of the judicial Process 102 (1922): "The juristic
philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism." See also
Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (Mr. justice Cardozo urging that
free will must be accepted as the working hypothesis of law).
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men act" can serve a functional purpose in the criminal proceeding.
Such presumptions or inferences can survive the free will-determinism
debate without alienating the medical expert. Indeed, the medical
expert's chief complaint is that he has not been given sufficient leeway
to explain "how most men act." Given this leeway, the expert wll be
able to aid in the establishment of medical premises necessary to
consider criminal responsibility under a legal insanity test.
II. RELATIVE FREE WILL: A NECESSARY ASSUMPTION
Before discussing the purpose or purposelessness of sanity (in
the context of criminal responsibility), it is necessary to assume-as a
matter of faith, if necessary-that criminal responsibility is based on
man's having a relative free will. To assume the contrary, that man is
completely determined by his history or his environment, is to assume
that man does not have the capacity to choose to conform to societal
standards as embodied in its criminal code. Moreover, to posit law on a
philosophy of determinism is to vitiate blameworthiness as a juristic
element of criminal responsibility.'
In accord with the majority of those who have considered the
subject, Dr. Bernard L. Diamond's4 position is that criminal law
could not exist without the assumption that each "normal" person
intends to do the act which he does do and that such intention is based
upon the exercise of free will. His rationalization becomes:
It does no good to proclaim to the jurist that scientific evidence
proves that there is no such thing as free will .... Illusory or not,
free will remains the basis of all criminal law simply because free
will is the basis of all normal social behavior .... The task then
becomes to understand the motivations, intent, and actions of the
individual who deviates from the common-sense posit of free will. 5
Diamond offers no empirical evidence to support his assertion.
Throughout Francis Wharton's standard treatise on criminal law
and jurisprudence, it is evident that he subsumes a capacity for
3 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Holloway
v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945): "Our collective conscience does
not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." Compare Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics
and the -Criminal Law," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 183, 189 (1958), who questions the efficacy
of "blameworthiness" as a necessary criterion.
4 Dr. Diamond is a practicing psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. Currently, he is the
Assistant Chief of Psychiatry, Mt. Zion Hospital, and Professor of Law and Criminology,
University of California, Berkeley.
5 Diamond, "With Malice Aforethought," 2 Archives of Crim. Psychodynamics 1,
27-28 (1957). See reference to his article in People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 724 n.4,
336 P.2d 492, 497 n.4 (1959).
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intellectual discrimination and freedom of will as necessary to the
consideration of criminal responsibility.6 The practical necessity of the
assumption is made all the more evident because, as Wharton
recognizes, from a speculative or metaphysical viewpoint, all acts may
be necessitated. But he is quick to add that jurisprudence is a "practical
science" and thus "has nothing to do" with such speculation.'
Even Sigmund Freud, considered by many to have been the
leading spokesman for the determinist school of clinical psychiatry,
was supposedly asked by one of his disciples: "Should a person be
held responsible for his dreams which are the products of uncon-
scious forces over which he has no conscious control?" His answer
(to be forever held to his discredit by some): "Who else but the
dreamer should be held responsible for his dreams?"' The com-
mentators9 concluded that Freud recognized the concept of responsi-
bility albeit in a purely practical sense."° But the point is apparent.
The medical expert may be capable of divorcing himself from the
operative philosophical presumptions (as distinct from clinically known
facts) of his profession when he enters the courtroom to participate in
the administration of criminal justice. The question remains: Will the
law construct its processes to maintain this separation of clinical and
judicial orientation?
Historically, it has been argued that law has survived because
most men desire it most of the time, even if-indeed because-it frus-
trates man's antisocial self-assertive impulses." If the law is an ex-
tension of self-control-a man's social interest in behavioral controp2
-the law has presupposed a will, at least the relative will to choose
6 1 Wharton, Criminal Law § 49, at 70 (12th ed. 1932). See also Blocker v. United
States, 288 F.2d 853, 858, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (free will as basic postulate); State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 680-84, 133
Atl. 274, 285-86 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926) (concurring).
7 1 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70 n.3. See also Slovenko, "Psychiatry, Criminal
Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist," 1963 Duke L.J. 395, 397; Hall, "The Psychiatrist
and Crime: A Threat to Society?" National Observer, Aug. 20, 1962.
8 Alexander & Staub, The Criminal, The Judge, and The Public 144 (1962)t. See also
1 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 82; Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine & Man 334 (1943).
Compare Freud, "Psychopathology of Everyday Life," in The Basic Writings of Sigmund
Freud 152 (Brill Transl. 1938): "there is nothing arbitrary or undetermined in the psychic
life."
9 Dr. Franz Alexander, a psychoanalyst, is the Chief of Psychiatric Research at Mt.
Sinai Hospital, Los Angeles.
1o Alexander & Staub, supra note 8, at 81-82.
11 West, Conscience and Society 175 (2d ed. 1950). Dr. West is a lecturer in Social
Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
12 Id. at 168.
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and to control; it has made that will the sine qua non of our legal
system. On that score, Dr. Sheldon Glueck 3 has said:
"[F]reedom of will"... [is] expressive of the law's presumption that
most men in most of the relations of life, can act purposefully and
can inhibit antisocial, illegal tendencies. 14
The use by Glueck of the word "purposefully" deserves consideration.
Glueck has found a justification for his position in the psychological
theory of McDougall. 15 McDougall's theory grapples with the free
will-determinism problem and comes to a reconciliation satisfactory
to Glueck and jurisprudents who want to satisfy medical experts that
they have a rational, though admittedly practical, discipline.
McDougall holds that man's instincts are his primary motiva-
tional force. Instincts are inherited, not acquired. They provide the
basis for social development, and they determine man's behavioral
response to his environment and to external stimuli. Thus, the deter-
ministic element is demonstrated. More importantly, however, Mc-
Dougall, unsympathetic with a psychology premised upon mechanistic
reflexes, recognized that man is a striving, creative individual whose
purpose, commensurate with the means employed to achieve that pur-
pose, is the desire to strive toward selected goals. 6 This behavioral
activity-striving toward selected goals-according to McDougall,
survives the stimulus because of man's purposive persistence to pursue
the activity."
Thus, freedom of will is employed by Glueck to accord with
McDougall's theory denominated as purposive psychology. Glueck's
understanding of free will is descriptive of man's capacity to act with
consciousness of purpose, although the basis of the act can be ex-
plained only by man's instinctive nature. "The law," Glueck con-
cludes, "following common sense and common morality, assumes a
certain degree of purposive capacity possessed by the normal mind."'18
Glueck's recognition of the psychiatrico-legal conflict, and his
18 Dr. Glueck, a criminologist, is currently the Roscoe Pound Professor of Law,
Harvard University.
14 Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 94 (1925).
15 See generally McDougall, Psychology 447-48 (1923).
16 It is possible that McDougall was inspired by the writing of Goethe on the philo-
sophical theory of striving as the means to a goal, as well as the goal, of man. See Goethe,
Faust Part I (MacNeice Transl. 1951).
17 For an informative precis of McDougall's contribution to psychiatry, see Sadler,
Theory and Practice of Psychiatry 28 (1936).
18 Glueck, op. cit. supra note 14, at 94. See, for a thorough-going analysis, Glueck,
"Ethics, Psychology and the Criminal Responsibility of the Insane," 14 JA. Inst. of Crim.
L. & Criminology 208 (1923).
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attempt at reconciliation in light of the greater social purpose to be
served by a pragmatically-oriented criminal law, can be contrasted with
Henry Weihofen's once-over-lightly treatment of the presumption
of sanity: "Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind,
the prosecution may proceed, in the first instance, upon the presump-
tion that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was
committed." 9
Again, as a matter of comparison, a perusal of the writing of
Enrico Ferri" will reveal the rational consequence of a decision not
to accept the relative free will compromise. Weihofen has not tackled
the issue, Glueck makes the rational compromise and Wharton ex-
plains the reason behind his assumption of free will; but Ferri sup-
posed free will to be purely a subjective illusion. This left only a
scientific theory of determinism which was evidently incapable of
practical application to the daily needs of social protection. 21 His
thesis, not one of compromise to preserve the existing system of
criminal jurisprudence, became a plea for "the less penal justice, the
more social justice. ' 22
Herbert Feigl, a contemporary philosopher and educator, dis-
turbed by the philosophical dilemma in which the science of psy-
chology has been emersed, offers a compromise to the free will-deter-
minism debate. The philosophy of Spinoza provides the springboard
for Feigl's approach. Man was free, according to Feigl's reading of
Spinoza, to the extent that his choices and his subsequent conduct
are governed, i.e., determined, by his personality and character. Feigl
argues that the fact that "personality and character in turn may have
been completely determined by antecedent conditions does not militate
against regarding our actions as a consequence of what we are at the
moment of action. '
In other words, man, although he may be the product of his
history and the environment, can control much of his own behavior
through mental "choices" consonant with his own personality and
character. That two problems are presented at the outset is clear. Left
unexplained is the basis for criminal responsibility for conduct
resulting from personality, if personality is in fact determined. Sec-
ondly, one of the fruits of Feigl's research is the assertion that Spinoza
19 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 214 (1954).
20 Ferri (1856-1929) was an Italian criminologist and politician.
21 Ferri, Criminal Sociology 394 (1917).
22 Id. at 569.
23 Feigl, 'Philosophical Embarrassments of Psychology," 14 The American Psy-
chologist 11., 116 (1959).
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fashioned man as a relatively free being. Feigl, however, has failed
to support the assertion. It would appear that Spinoza has been
recognized as one of the most thorough-going deterministic philoso-
phers.24 Spinoza rejected the concept of "free will" as that term is
commonly understood. And though he does not deny a form of de-
liberately chosen action, the action does not involve "free will." Rather,
it is the illusion of will-undetermined choice-which persists because
of man's ignorance of antecedent causes of thought and action. 25
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, medical experts should
recognize that they are not the strict determinists they profess to be.
For example, the psychotherapist, far from a two-headed freak of the
medical profession, is nonetheless one-part determinist (in his role as
psychiatrist) and one-part "free willist" (in his role as therapist).
Though the play on words may be artificial, it is not a game for the
psychotherapist. And the paradox is more apparent than real.
On the one hand, as a psychiatrist, the psychotherapist must be-
lieve that determinism is the fundamental tenant of his etiology. The
alternative to a strictly deterministic philosophy is chaos, unpre-
dictability, and a denial of cause and effect relationships in the in-
vestigation of disease.26 On the other hand, the psychotherapist expects
to "cure" his patient by releasing him from the grip of deterministic
factors which bind him to his illness. The psychotherapist, as a thera-
pist, requires the operative assumption of freedom of will to func-
tion as an active influence on his patient. But freedom of will cannot
be understood in terms of its traditionally accepted meaning. Rather,
the psychotherapist understands that his therapeutic methods are, in
fact, operating deterministically to achieve for his patient a sense of
"subjective freedom."'27
"Subjective freedom" for psychotherapeutic patients has little
to do with freedom of will. Yet it is not a spurious term. The "free"
person makes ego-synotic choices, has "good" motives, and is able to
carry out what he wills to do.28
24 Bernard, "Freud and Spinoza," 9 Psychiatry 99, 100-01, 108 (1946). Bernard opts
for the position that Spinoza as well as Freud found that "nothing happens in the mind
which does not acknowledge a cause for its existence, and there is nothing free, arbitrary
or accidental in its manifestations." Id. at 100.
25 It would appear that Spinoza recognized sociological and political necessity as
the raison d'etre of a criminal code. Man could be governed only by fear.
26 Knight, "Determinism, 'Freed6m,' and Psychotherapy," 9 Psychiatry 251, 262
(1946). Dr. Robert P. Knight, at the time this article was published, was serving as Chief
of Staff, The Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas. The article is a brilliant exposition of the
medical resolution of the free will-determinism conffict.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 256.
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Expressed in its clearest terms, the psychotherapist operates on
the assumption that determinism
says merely that the individual's total make-up and probable reac-
tions at any given moment are strictly determined by all the forces,
early and late, external and internal, past and present which have
played on him and are playing on him. But new forces and in-
fluences are always being added which have the possibility of alter-
ing the end product, and a scientific psychotherapy-or any other
scientifically applied therapeutic influence--becomes a new causal
factor brought to bear on the sick patient .... Psychotherapy as a
new determining influence in the patient's life can be optimistic
precisely because of the principle of determinism, not in spite of it.2 9
In summary, our system of criminal responsibility, having "blame-
worthiness" as its moral foundation, demands that the law establish a
postulate of relative free will. Relative free will implies a relative
freedom to act in socially acceptable ways. Thus, the premise of rela-
tive free will becomes functional in the form of a presumption or an
inference that most of us will act in a socially acceptable manner.
Some say that this is the presumption of sanity. All courts recognize
that presumption."0 But what the law means and what the law says
can be (and often are) two entirely different phenomena.
III. THE FUNCTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY IN COURT
The presumption of sanity (as it is currently phrased in all juris-
dictions) is used functionally to make the criminal proceeding more
efficient within a framework of social justice. The orthodox rule on
the sanity presumption places the initial burden of presenting evidence
of insanity (the risk of nonproduction) on the defendant.3 ' If the
defendant fails in his initial duty to go forward with the evidence, he
may be presumed "sane" by the jury, since it is generally accepted
that most men are "sane.""2 The defendant's initial burden is met in
the federal courts by his introducing some evidence of his insanity.a3
29 Id. at 260. (Emphasis added.) See also Zilboorg, op. cit. supra note 8; Sundberg
& Tyler, Clinical Psychology 47-48 (1962); Menninger, "Freedom" in A Psychiatrist's
World 803 (1959).
30 See Wehofen, op. cidt. supra note 19, at 214.
31 Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 19, at 227.
32 It would not be specious to argue that the class of "sane" men which must be
considered in this context is the universal class of men, not the class of men formally
charged with the commission of crime. See Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1951). If the class is not limited to defendants, Enrico Ferr's position that
crime always shows a condition of abnormality becomes less relevant to the inquiry. See
text accompanying note 78 infra. But see Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895).
33 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). The Court held at 486-87: "the
accused is bound to produce some evidence that will impair or weaken the force of the
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In state courts, this burden may be met by introducing a scintilla
of evidence-roughly equivalent to "some" evidence.3 4 More often,
however, the initial burden is met by raising a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's mental (criminal) responsibility for the anti-social
conduct alleged.35
The second clearly separable burden-that of persuasion (the
risk of non-persuasion)-under the orthodox rule is placed on the
prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is criminally responsible (blameworthy) for the alleged act. 0 Under
the English rule, still in force in several states, the defendant would
have the duty of convincing the jury by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the presumption or the inference of sanity does not apply
in his case, in other words, that he was not responsible mentally for
his conduct.3 7 As a compromise position, it has been suggested that the
burden of persuasion rest with the prosecution, but that the prosecu-
tion need only have a preponderance of the evidence to justify the
jury's use of the presumption or the inference of sanity. This attempt
at reconciliation has not been adopted in any jurisdiction,
In addition to the two distinct burdens, or risks, present during
the course of the trial relating to the presumption of sanity, some
question remains as to the continuing nature of the presumption. In
other words, what is the evidentiary weight given to the presumption
of sanity? Further dissection of the question will lead to a deter-
mination of the functional value of the presumption (1) when evidence
has been admitted (produced) tending to prove insanity, i.e., to rebut
the presumption, or (2) when prosecution and defense have rested
and the court is about to instruct the jury.
Misused, in this context, are the terms "presumption" and "in-
legal presumption in favor of sanity." The burden of "some evidence" is further attenu-
ated by the Court's proviso that the defendant's obligation "in a certain sense ...may
be true ...where the defense is insanity, and where the case made by the prosecution
discloses nothing whatever in excuse or attenuation of the crime charged... ." Id. at 486.
34 American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 349 (Lindman
& McIntyre ed. 1961).
35 Ibid.
386 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence §§ 452, 453 (5th ed. 1956); 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2501 (3d ed. 1940).
37 Ibid. Oregon, the last state to demand of the defendant proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of his insanity, amended its statute to require proof only by a preponderance of
the evidence. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 136.390 (1959). This amendment, however, followed a
decision by the Supreme Court, upholding the harsher burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), affirming 190 Ore. 598, 227
P.2d 785 (1951). But see Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1003 (Alaska 1962).
38 But see Blocker v. United States, supra note 6, at 865 n.20 (concurring opinion).
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ference." The former term, when used functionally, implicitly (if not
explicitly) is preceded by the word, "legal." Thus, a legal presumption
of sanity means that sanity will be presumed, where it cannot ra-
tionally be found, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The
presumption ought to disappear as a rule of law when such evidence
has been admitted to raise the factual issue of sanity.39 Functionally,
the presumption operates merely to shift the burden of "producing"
evidence of sanity in order to expedite the trial.
An inference, when used functionally, implicitly (if not ex-
plicitly) is preceded by the term, "factual." Thus, a factual inference
of sanity means that sanity will be inferred because there is a strong
factual probability that the defendant on trial is sane. The inference
ought to disappear as a matter of fact only when the jury is convinced
that the prosecution has met the burden of "persuasion" on that issue
(regardless of the party on whom the burden of "production" has
been placed). The factual inference, consequently, serves a functional
purpose, long after the legal presumption has been dispelled.
As early as Daniel M'Naghten's Case,4" there is evidence that the
courts confused these terms. The Court said that
the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to
be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their
satisfaction .... 41
Clearly, Lord Chief Justice Tindal spoke the language of "presump-
tions," but had in mind a factual inference which the jury could find
even though evidence to the contrary had been received.
This distinction has not been uniformly made by the courts. In the
federal courts (according to Davis v. United States42) sanity, though
labeled a legal presumption, is functionally a factual inference which
should be considered by the jury regardless of the weight of the
prosecution's evidence on sanity.4 But some cases indicate that the
39 Wigmore, Evidence § 491 (3d ed. 1940).
40 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200 (1843).
41 Id. at 722, 10 Clark & Finnelly at 210.
42 160 U.S. 469 (1895),.
43 The assumption is, of course, that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to over-
come a directed verdict on the ground of insanity. The Davis Court said at 488:
If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of sanity, does
not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of which some
proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of the specific offense
charged.
(Emphasis added.)
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Davis presumption does disappear. In Blocker v. United States,44 the
court of appeals reversed Blocker's conviction on an erroneous instruc-
tion.4 5 Two other instructions were clearly approved by the court in
dicta, although both clearly stated that the "presumption" disappeared
when some evidence of insanity was "produced" by the defendant 6
In the state courts, the confusion occurs in much the same fashion.
And chaos reigns even among courts following the same rule on burdens
of proof, i.e., orthodox or English.
In the wilderness of reason, some courts have made this distinc-
tion which is necessary to analyze "sanity" within a correct legal
framework. In State v. Pike,4 s for example, the court recognized that
if sanity had any evidentiary weight it could not be called a legal
presumption.
The presumption of sanity is not an artificial or legal presumption,
but a natural inference of fact to be made by a jury from the
absence of evidence to show that a party did not enjoy that sound-
ness which experience proves to be the general condition of the
human mind.49
IV. "IT IS THE EXPLANATION OF THE ABNORMALITY,
NOT ITS NAME, THAT IS IMPORTANT." '5
Much has been written on the nature of the presumption. What
has been neglected is the nature of "sanity." For whatever one might
posit as a justification for the presumption, its usefulness is vitiated
when no one-neither judge, jury, nor medical expert-knows what
sanity is. An attempt will be made to give some meaning to this
evasive term by showing what it is not, and, hopefully, what it could be.
The law has properly recognized sanity as an issue of fact. But
the law has been unable to define the term in a functional manner
which would allow the medical expert to offer an explanation of "how
most people act" to the jury.51 Generally, courts have discussed it in
terms of "what happens to it" rather than "what it is."'52
44 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
45 Id. at 855.
46 Id. at 855-56. See, e.g., Record, Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir.
1956), in Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law 775 (1962). See also Judge
Miller's dissenting opinion in Blocker v. United States, supra note 44, at 877, discovering
the oversight of his brethren.
47 See, e.g., Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1003 (Alaska 1962). For a comprehensive
nose-counting of the states, see Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 19, at 241-72.
48 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
49 Id. at 444.
50 Blocker v. United States, supra note 44, at 864.
51 Courts have strewn medical and legal terms throughout their opinions with
abandon. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, supra note 3, at 667: 'For the purposes of
conviction there is no twilight zone between abnormality and insanity. An offender is
wholly sane or wholly insane."
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Sanity is not a term in the jargon of the medical expert. In fact, it
would seem that the medical expert believes, quite erroneously, that the
jurist really means "normality" when he speaks of "sanity." Few
medical experts are willing to recognize that "normality" is functionally
descriptive.
Dr. Herbert A. Bloch, a sociologist and anthropologist con-
cerned about the importance given to his field by criminologists, has
concluded that "the legal definition (of normalcy) is certainly not
equivalent to the sociological and psychological conceptions of nor-
malcy. M3
But, it would appear, the medical expert will not bridge the
communicative gap and testify in a manner functionally serviceable
when the announced question is one of sanity. More importantly, the
jury, who will be instructed on the presumption of sanity, either has
heard no testimony on the subject of sanity, or has heard only what
sanity is not.
Many medical experts believe that they are being taken advantage
of when they are called to testify in the criminal proceeding. As soon
as they are questioned about sanity, about presumptions, and about
responsibility, they rebel:
The psychiatrist, instead of leaving his clinical armamentarium
at the entrance door of the courtroom and borrowing whatever
antiquated speculatives are offered to him by battling lawyers, will
feel on much more solid ground, and he will become much more
effective, if he carries with him his strict clinical standard directly
to the witness stand.54
The medical expert reacts to the question of sanity in much the
same manner as he does to the question of criminal responsibility. He
considers them legal questions, not within his professional expertise.
Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, taking an extreme position, but one which should
point up the problem, minces no words when he suggests that:
Official psychiatry would perform the greatest service to law and
medicine if it would decree that any expert psychiatric testimony
admitting the existence of legal insanity [or sanity] and accepting
the concept of legal responsibility is not in accordance with the basic
52 See, e.g., State v. Pike, supra note 48, at 442-43; Wheeler, An Introductory Lecture
Upon Criminal Jurisprudence 15 (1827).
53 Bloch, "Legal, Sociological and Psychiatric Variations in the Interpretation of the
Criminal Act," in Nice, Crime and Insanity 68 (1958).
54 Zilboorg, "Misconceptions of Legal Insanity," 9 Am. J. of Orthopsychiatry 540,
553 (1939). See also Guttmacher, "What Can the Psychiatrist Contribute to the Issue of
Criminal Responsibility?" 136 J. Nerv. & Ment. Diseases 103, 107 (1963).
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tradition of the profession and automatically and officially dis-
qualifies the expert in the eyes of the profession itself. 5
Courts in several jurisdictions have recognized the communi-
cative gap. The court in Stewart v. United States saw in the Durham
rule an attempt "to remove some of the 'barrier[s] to communication
between lawyers and physicians.' ,,66 Similarly, in McDonald v. United
States, the court seemed aware of the possibility that the expert in the
course of his testimony might be asked, in an effort to make his ut-
terances comply with the legal definition, to go beyond his peculiar
expertise. The court said, in a footnote:
An expert may not be compelled to testify in these terms if he be-
lieves they are essentially moral or legal considerations beyond the
scope of his special competence as a behavioral scientist. 7
Although this court has heeded Zilboorg's caveat, it apparently has
not considered that the issue of sanity may be plagued with the same
weaknesses as the issues of right and wrong, responsibility, or fault.
Necessity demands that the most functional terms be employed, terms
that will give the medical expert the least difficulty when he is bound
to communicate the defendant's malaise to the jury.
A. The "Sane" Criminal
"Sanity" cannot be defined merely as the state of being of the
majority. Conformity cannot be confused with sanity, or with a rela-
tively sane society. Some would assert that because the conduct of
the majority will govern the standard for the society, the particular
conduct of that majority is relevant to the "sanity" determination. In
other words, mental health (sanity) is characterized by the majority's
adjustment to society. This approach to the problem of sanity has
encountered bitter debate. Erich Fromm, representing a school of
dissenters, argues that "the fact that millions of people show the same
forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane. 518 Mental
health or sanity, according to Fromm, would be defined only in terms
of the adjustment of society to the needs of man. The sane individual,
55 Id. at 551. (Emphasis added.) Dr. Zilboorg (1870-1959) was an internationally
recognized psychiatrist. His extensive writing included: Mind, Medicine & Man (1943);
The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment (1954).
56 Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1957). (Citations omitted.)
57 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (citing Stewart
v. United States). See also State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 592-94, 115 N.W.2d 505, 518-19
(1962).
58 Fromm, The Sane Society 15 (1955). Pathology, as viewed by Fromm, can be
defined only in terms of the individual's lack of adjustment to the ways of life in his
society. Id. at 12.
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for Fromm, is not an individual matter. His sanity depends in large
measure on the structure of his society.59 The reductio ad absurdum,
argument is that the equation of "sanity" with "majority conformity"
produces a resultant society where fifty percent of the population plus
one can fail to adjust to society's standards and be "sane" in the eyes
of the law."0
B. The Myth of Normality
An alternative implied, if not actually suggested, by some writers
to clear the muddied definition of sanity, is that normality be sub-
stituted for sanity. Though the jury's misconceptions about normality
may not run them quite so far afield as the possible misconceptions
concerning sanity, medical experts will still not be satisfied. Simply,
the medical expert cannot "work" with the term in his professional
capacity, fireside theories to the contrary.
Sadler, in his text on psychiatry, implies by his discussion that
"the so-called normal individual is only a theoretic postulation."" One
psychiatrist shows his contempt for the term by saying:
A psychiatrist of long and fruitful experience once remarked that
the difference between the normal man and the one who is mentally
sick, was that the latter was inside the walls of a hospital and the
former was not.62
Normality, however, is not a meaningless term to all psychiatrists.
But the meaning ascribed does not necessarily give the term a func-
tional capacity for the psychiatrist, let alone for the law. 3 Thus,
"normality" can connote an appreciation of the conscious elements
of the mind. But since behavior is almost universally recognized as
a product of both conscious and unconscious processes acting jointly,
normality is only partially descriptive at best. If "behavior which is
determined largely by conscious factors, is flexibly adopted to reality
and modified by experience, may be spoken of as 'normal,' ,,64 the
59 Id. at 72. But see Fromm, Man for Himself 233 (1947).
60 For the argument, the assumption is that the numerically weaker group has
effective control over the institutions and can enforce the law (society's standards) on the
majority.
61 Sadler, op. cit. supra note 11, at 123. (Emphasis in original.)
62 Strecker & Ebaugh, Practical Clinical Psychiatry 20 (4th ed. 1935).
63 But much of the following discussion ignores the fact that some jurists have for
some time-in some circles-held that the law cannot or will not recognize subconscious
states, needs, or mechanisms.
64 Noyes & Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry 2 (5th ed. 1961). See also Roche, The
Criminal Mind 26 (1959).; Wily & Stallworthy, Mental Abnormality and the Law 38
(1962).
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spectre of the genuinely abnormal-but nonetheless criminally respon-
sible-individual rises again. Simply because one is unable consciously
to control his behavior at any time, does not make such an individual
"abnormal" and thus immune from criminal prosecution. 5 According
to Dr. Philip Q. Roche, however, illness can be defined as the degree to
which the unconscious forces dominate behavior. 6  Thus, the normally-
ill-responsible person! But, if this is the best the jurist can offer, judge
and jury will run rampant in search of self-conceived solutions to prob-
lems not within their expertise. The fault lies in an inefficacious choice
of words.
C. The "Mentally Sick" Law Obeyer
Another twisting and pounding of words, for purposes of demon-
stration, results in the characterization of an individual, socially
"normal" (sane), but mentally ill. The fallacy to be represented is that
of formulating a statistically "normal" group based on a counting of
noses of those who have not committed antisocial (criminal) con-
duct.67 Here, the differences between sociological and psychological
sanity---or normality-become apparent. In our own heterogeneous
society, the individual is forced to recognize and in no small part
conform to an "enormous diversity of standards of normalcy for
different groups, based on the conceptions of regional, sectional, class,
ethnic, sociocultural, religious, educational, and economic differ-
ences." 68 This, at times, overwhelming necessity to conform to a
variety of different and ofttimes conflicting standards of normality
may have a profound psychological effect upon the individual. Thus,
an individual may, at one and the same time, be sociologically normal,
but disoriented psychologically. Paradoxically, the more outwardly
successful the individual becomes in meeting his struggle to adhere to
the sociological norm, the more difficult his inward struggle may be-
come.
65 "The tendency to look on those who manifest nervous or mental symptoms as
being different in their organization from the so-called 'normal' is erroneous." Noyes &
Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry 58 (6th ed. 1963).
66 Roche, op. cit. supra note 64, at 26. But Dr. Roche would agree that conscious
control of behavior is a measure of relative freedom of will. "Such freedom is an essential
criterion of normality, of mental health." Id. at 23.
67 See Zilboorg, op. cit. supra note 8, at 121-22 ("normal" does not mean average).
See also Reiwald, Society and its Criminals 85-86 (1950):
This assumption (that mental or psychic health is equivalent to social health)
shows the power of the majority; but it does not accord well with reality and
excludes the question of the abnormality of the so-called normal, of the person
who conforms to the rules of society.
68 Bloch, op. cit. supra note 53, at 74.
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As Dr. Herbert Bloch indicates, the compulsive neurotic, classified
by his punctilious conformity to the rituals, mandates, and require-
ments which his society imposes upon him, may, in a strictly socio-
logical sense, be far more normal than the otherwise well-integrated
and well-balanced individual, who expresses more openly his protest
against the constricting standards of his society.69
The law, curbing "the urges and desires of the individual" which
constantly seek free expression, 7 may well be the cause of the in-
dividual's need to control or modify such desires. In turn, the mental
illness is caused because of the inadequate development of the control
factors derived essentially from society, although their form and
strength is determined by factors peculiar to the individual and
related to his personality and experience.
Thus, a "normal" person may successfully curb his antisocial
desires. But such success may lack the expected sweet smell. Many
have found that such repression of aggressive tendencies may have
painful or disabling results to the individual who supposedly chose
via his (relative) free will not to venture an affront to the demands
of his "social" instinct.71
The innate inability of the law to cope with this conflict can be
inferred from the writings of Fromm and Freud: "That human nature
and society can have conflicting demands, and hence that a whole
society can be sick.... 72 And if we make the assumption that society
is somehow sick, Freud's finding that the mechanisms of neurotic
thought can be taken as a general mental process of "normal" man-
kind73 allows the law to label the neurotic "normal" although he may
have a mental illness which is disabling.
Thoreau appreciated this dilemma in a philosophical context,
appropriate for consideration here:
The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called
resignation is confirmed desperation.... A stereotyped but uncon-
scious despair is concealed even under what are called the games and
amusements of mankind. 74
The point? Normality and sanity are words of art that have yet
69 Id. at 75.
70 Dr. David Slight, a psychiatrist, defines normality in terms of an assumption that
the "normal" individual is able to tend to his "urges and desires" in such a way that he
will derive personal satisfaction in ways that are "socially acceptable." Slight, "Disorgani-
zation in the Individual and in Society," 42 Am. J. of Sociology 840, 840-41 (1936-37).
71 West, op. cit. supra note 11, at 160.
72 Fromm, op. cit. supra note 58, at 19.
73 West, op. cit. supra note 11, at 164.
74 Thoreau, Walden, ch. 1 (1854).
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to be artfully defined. There is too much disagreement among those
who testify as to their meaning to conclude that these words have
functional efficacy. Moreover, such words may be narrowly viewed
by some to classify only the socially approved conduct of individuals
internally disoriented. Arguably, Dr. Stafford-Clark summed up the
essential error in our thinking when he concluded that psychiatrists
tend to center their conception of what is "normal" around their own
experiences. 5
D. Normality-the Ability to Cooperate
As an example of the breadth of the spectrum of criteria descrip-
tive of normality, the Adlerian approach is noteworthy. Adler, in his
paper, "Technique of Treatment," first read in 1932, emphasized
that "a person can reach a normal condition only when he can achieve
the necessary degree of ability to cooperate," to present himself as a
part of the whole (the social instinct).
A necessarily inadequate precis of Adler's theory demonstrates
that most nervous and mental disorders grow out of a definite striving
for power which is pursued in an effort to compensate for feelings of
inferiority. The struggle for power is an outgrowth of the Nietzschean
concept of a will to power. Inferiority, in no small part, is induced by
consciousness of organ inferiority, and also stems from a feeling of
social inadequacy. The struggle toward justification of the feeling of
social inadequacy is the neurosis. The manifestation of the struggle will
take the form of social service (herein lies the "normal" individual)
or other less desirable power attainments. Adler would include crime
and insanity among the manifestations of the urge to compensate for
the self-sensitive consciousness of inferiority.7
E. Reductio ad Absurdum
To round out the picture of the inutile quality of "normality,"
some theorists, whose adherents might some day serve as medical ex-
perts, twist the concept of normality so that the result is to offer the
law the alternative of punishing no one or punishing itself (society).
Enrico Ferri finds normality unacceptable as a basis for criminal
responsibility. He argues that "a truly normal man cannot commit
crime: a crime always shows abnormality, either congenital or
acquired, permanent or transitory. ' " The result under Ferrian logic:
crowded hospitals.
75 Stafford-Clark, Psychiatry Today 60 (2d ed. 1963).
76 Adler, Superiority and Social Interest 199 (Ansbacher & Ansbacher ed. 1964).
77 See Sadler, Theory and Practice of Psychiatry 18-22 (1936).
78 Ferri, op. cit. supra note 21, at 393.
[Vol. 27
SANITY: COMMUNICATIVE GAP
True, Freud did speak of man's responsibility for his dreams.79
But his willingness to compromise in order to have law and order does
not justify the use of normality as the presumption or inference to
be favored by courts or medical experts. Normality, for Freud, was
an ideal fiction.80 True, Freud's pragmatism found a need for law. The
laws of civilization are necessary to protect us from the "normal"
individual."1
CONCLUSION
If law (conceived from our traditional notion that responsibility
to law presupposes blameworthiness) is desirable, law demands an
operative presupposition of free will. This operative presupposition,
functional in the context of practical socio-legal jurisprudence, is ac-
ceptable to the medical expert. In fact, the medical expert himself
must harmonize the deterministic assumptions of his profession, opera-
tive in the etiological field, with the "relative free will" assumptions,
operative in the field of therapeutics.
The operative legal presupposition of free will justifies a legal
presumption or a factual inference of "sanity" (how most men act),
which will serve one or more of the following functions: (1) that of
expediting the criminal proceeding by distributing the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion, (2) that of permitting a jury finding of "san-
ity" in the absence of any contrary evidence, and (3) that of per-
mitting a jury finding of "sanity" even where some evidence of
"insanity" has been introduced. The determination of the particular
function to be employed in any single jurisdiction is not the concern
of the medical expert.
But, if the medical expert is invited to participate in the criminal
proceeding, the law must recognize and appreciate his professional
integrity; in other words, the law must learn to speak his language.
While the law should resist any effort of another discipline to im-
pose its terms upon the law, judges should be hospitable to allow-
ing technical experts to express themselves in terms meaningful to
them .... A standard of criminal responsibility which is intelligible
to laymen will, of necessity, be in terms other than those of the
psychiatrist's discipline.82
Whatever the legal test for responsibility for antisocial conduct
79 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
80 Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," 18 Int. J. of Psychoanalysis 375,
389 (1937).
81 Freedman, "Conformity and Nonconformity," in Hock & Zubin, Psychiatry and
the Law 45 (1955). Compare Freud, supra note 80, at 390.
82 Blocker v. United States, supra note 44, at 864. See also United States v. Freeman,
2d Cir. 354 F.2d fn. 42, 43, 51, 55.
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may be, the test should be responsive to changing medical technology;
the medically determinable premises of the chosen test must be
couched in terms meaningful to the medical expert. Only then can he
communicate his medical conclusions in terms meaningful to judge
and jury.
